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Our purpose in writing this article 
is to bolster the government auditor’s
ability to detect procurement fraud
through the use of information tech-
nology (IT) tools in performing more 
sophisticated data analytics and effec-
tive audit testing. The largely quanti-
tative, data-driven testing orientation 
of this article makes minimal use of
qualitative and behavioral considera-
tions. However, we do acknowledge 
the importance of a comprehensive, 
integrated and balanced approach fea-
turing both quantitative and qualitative
methods to achieve the best results. 
The principles of effective fraud 
auditing cut across prevention, deter-
rence and detection considerations. 
We will, however, primarily focus on
fraud detection in this article. Specific
fraud-detection principles learned by 
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Substantial attention has recently been given to fraud detection 
and how various fraud schemes go undetected by internal and external 
auditors in different organizations. While Congress—in its passage 
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002—the media,corporate America and
the auditing profession have generally focused on the public 
accountant’s role as external auditor, much can be gained by 
improving the fraud detection effectiveness of the government 
auditor. Just in the area of improper payments, with respect to the 
federal government, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates $20 
billion in 2000 and 2001.The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
recently testified that, for major benefit programs, improper payments were in
the range of approximately $35 billion annually.1
It is important to note here that improper payments do not necessarily equate
to fraudulent payments, which would presume an intent to deceive. In the 
area of Medicare claims for example, many abusive practices would not fall
under the legal definition of fraud,nor should auditors hastily classify payments
as such.2 In this article,our intent is to specifically address the types of procure-
ment transactions that are symptomatic of and may indicate fraudulent 
behavior.The GAO also noted that control weaknesses in numerous agencies
concerning procurement credit cards “created a lax control environment that 
allowed cardholders to make fraudulent, improper, abusive and questionable
purchases.”3 Separately, a 2002 survey by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners has reported that 25 percent of fraud incidents occurred in govern-
ment agencies,with a $48,000 median loss.4 Given these figures,we conjecture
that state, county and other local government agencies most likely experience
proportionate losses. In responding to such an environment, GAO stated,
“Tackling areas at risk for fraud will require determination, persistence and 
sustained attention.”5
experience will demonstrate universal
application to a variety of individual 
situations. We hope that such a principle-
based approach will provide greater 
insight and benefits in the long run, as
the ability to adapt and adjust to a chang-
ing environment will serve government
auditors in any agency much more than
simply following a standard checklist.
The government auditor should cus-
tomize the application of general fraud
detection principles to specific facts and
circumstances and use sound profes-
sional judgment. Procurement fraud 
detection tests may help identify fraud-
ulent activity but also inefficiencies,
waste and abuse. Although the size of 
the agency will likely influence the 
extent of the auditor’s fraud detection
program, the principles enunciated here
can be applied at departments of all
sizes. Of course, outcomes such as loss
prevention and recovering or saving
dollars are always desirable.
PROCUREMENT FRAUD
Procurement fraud can occur during
different phases of the procurement
process by the initiation, delivery
and payment for goods and
services. The initiation process
typically includes bidding
and the creation of purchase
orders; the delivery process
includes the receiving and
inventory functions; and









of the most efficient means of testing 
both small and large amounts of data 
for detecting procurement fraud. By def-
inition, data analysis and data mining
techniques are highly dependent on 
underlying data, its existence, quality
and integrity. Of the three phases of pro-
curement noted above, the data-inten-
sive payment function furnishes the best
available data analysis prospects, and
hence, that is the area we will emphasize
in this article. Throughout this article we
assume a fraud auditing team composi-
tion, whether or not part of the internal
audit function, to include individuals
equipped with a solid understanding of
human behavior and possessing skills in
accounting, computer programming,
data bases, statistics, internal controls and
business processes of the specific entity.6
THE FRAUD RISK HYPOTHESIS
Experienced auditors develop fraud
risk hypotheses7 when investigating one 
or more specific instances of fraudulent 
behavior: gathering, understanding and
analyzing the available data, developing
fraud risk hypotheses, refining them as
necessary, arriving at two rival hypothe-
ses eventually (for example, is this an 
unintentional error or is it deliberate
fraud?; if fraud, what type of fraud
scheme was employed?), and going
about confirming one or the other.8 In 
designing a fraud detection regimen, 
the government auditor uses a similar
approach: The auditor must ask, “How
could the system be exploited?” In other
words, when performing a control sys-
tems vulnerability analysis the gov-
ernment auditor must scrutinize the
potential weaknesses of the internal
controls over the procurement process. 
The government auditor should 
embrace both a controls orientation 
as well as a fraud risk orientation. A
well-implemented system such as SAP, 
Oracle or PeopleSoft will include sev-
eral built-in controls. Under the con-
trols orientation approach, the auditor
should look for possible breakdowns
or circumventions of existing controls.
Here, the auditor should not seek to 
duplicate tests already available, unless
there is reason to believe that a controls
breakdown has occurred. The auditor
should also be aware of the extent to
which the organization uses Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI) to effect pro-
curement transactions. The controls 
orientation contrasts with the fraud risk
approach, which makes a rebuttable
presumption about the “ineffectiveness
of (existing) controls.” Every critical 
aspect of the procurement process from
the ground up is challenged, and the
government auditor begins by: review-
ing the procurement budget, identifying
approval limits, purchase order initia-
tion and processing, the use of credit
cards and “smart cards,” observing the
general level of scrutiny over transac-
tions, all the way through to ultimate 
authorized disbursement. Such a review
must be supplemented by carefully 
designing tests to select transactions 
fitting each pattern and doing a “walk-
through.” In addition, it is important 
to recognize that the specificity of each
test may increase with the size and com-
plexity of the organization. For example,
compiling a list of top vendors and 
contemplating the reasonableness of 
the list at a one-location, relatively small
organization may prove effective, but 
attempting the same test without mod-
ification at a large, federal agency may
not be as successful.
We now focus on the principles of
fraud detection used to apply the fraud
risk hypothesis approach. 
Not all fraud schemes can effectively be detected using data-driven approaches. 
Instances of corruption—bribery, kickbacks and the like—and collusion consistently 
involve circumvention of controls. Searching relevant transaction data for patterns and
unexplained relationships often fails to yield results because the information may 
not be recorded, per se, by the system. Behavioral concepts and qualitative factors 
frequently allow the auditor to look beyond the data, both with respect to data
that is there and data that isn’t.
The following case demonstrates an effective application of a fraud risk 
hypothesis to an audit of procurement card transactions.
Analyzing the Data
Procurement credit card data provided in this case included all trans-
action information for all procurement cards for several years. The 
department properly controlled access to the cards, which meant the
auditors could link all transaction data to the individual purchaser. 
Developing Risk Hypotheses
The analysis focused on the transaction level and determined that
fraud could surface in the form of unexplained patterns or significant
cost overruns. Based on the controls over access, the auditors hypoth-
esized a high risk of a perpetrator making purchases from a familiar
vendor. Thus, the auditors designed tests to find large deviations from
past history, wide disparity among seemingly similar cards, or a large
number of purchases from the same vendor or group of vendors. These
tests provided the highest potential for detection.
Confirming Risk Hypotheses
A summary of each card’s activity for each billing period identified
several instances of significantly higher activity than the average. Only
one such card, however, showed a higher than average activity 
without a reasonable explanation. Going back to the transaction detail,
the auditors found that fuel purchases—a common and authorized
use—comprised the majority of the activity. After quickly arranging
the data by date and obtaining relevant information from the com-
pany, the auditors surmised that this particular driver would have had
to drive continuously more than 1,000 miles a day to justify the amount
of fuel he purchased. 
Solving the Problem 
The subsequent investigation identified the entirety of the scheme:
Whenever he had to fill up the vehicle, his friends and family would
meet him at the pump, and he would fill up all the vehicles courtesy








and the like operate under a similar
principle, “know your audience.” The
slogan for detecting fraud is “know
your data.” The GIGO Effect—Garbage
In Garbage Out—is particularly relevant
in data testing. The most sophisticated
data analysis capabilities cannot cure
underlying defects or impurities in the
data itself. First of all, it is important to
gain an understanding of how the data
fields in the system work together. For
instance, does the invoice date really
mean invoice date and is not subject to
alteration or manipulation? Does the
payment date represent the date the
payment was processed or the date the
check was written, etc.? Keep in mind
that data mining is not expected to
“cleanse the data.” That is, success of the
data mining effort is heavily dependent
on data quality and integrity. Second,
the auditor, or audit team must ensure
that the test will really answer the 
intended question. Frequently, auditors
will run a specific CAAT because it’s
“one of the tests.” Government organi-
zations run on budgets, and all work
must fit under the budget umbrella.
Therefore, auditors should design and
run tests to provide the best answers first.
Know the Purpose, Nature 
and Scope of Your Tests
In terms of measuring performance,
what are we most concerned about and
how will we measure success: by the
number of possible frauds uncovered
(fraud incidence) or by the dollar value 
of the detected frauds (fraud impact)?
The former does not consider the 
magnitude of the possible fraudulent 
activity. The latter requires the auditor to
prioritize the tests from most effective
to least effective and allocate resources 
accordingly. Tests must be aligned to 
satisfy pre-established performance 
criteria. Auditors should guard against
performing tests that consistently iso-
late only widely known inefficiencies
or low-dollar fraudulent behavior—
it saps other precious resources. Addi-
tionally, properly designed tests can 
also help distinguish between isolated
occurrences and pervasive/systemic




What constitutes the best answers?
With an unlimited budget, auditors
could perform numerous tests and 
investigate all anomalies. Because budg-
ets constrain the use of both time and 
personnel, the successful fraud detection
program must maximize the trade-off
between cost and effectiveness as shown
in Figure 1. 
The figure illustrates how to catego-
rize audit testing procedures to priori-
tize. Auditors should obviously avoid
tests in quadrants I and III. Tests in the
unshaded area of quadrant II, such as
customized and focused data base 
procedures, are the most preferred as
they yield maximally discriminating
test results. Despite the higher cost,
these tests are rather sophisticated and,
therefore, can provide consistently more
effective results. It should be noted, that
tests like digital analysis (also called
Benford’s Law, see “Other Tests” below)
falling in quadrant IV, while superfi-
cially appearing to offer an equal degree
of effectiveness, really only succeed in
identifying the so-called “low-hanging
fruit” that may not adequately address
the auditor’s fraud risk hypotheses.
Know Your Software Platform
and Sampling Potential
Successful testing for procurement
fraud, especially at the transaction level,
in large organizational settings requires
analyzing millions of records. And,
rather than sampling a representative
number of records, we can test the entire
population of transactions using census
sampling. Realistically, practically and
functionally, only an enterprise data base
such as Microsoft’s SQL Server, IBM’s
DB2, or similar system can provide the
processing power needed for compre-
hensive testing procedures. Less tech-
nologically proficient team members can
be trained to use an application such as
ACLor IDEAto connect to the main data
base, so that the more familiar program
acts as a front-end. 
After determining and finalizing a 
battery of fraud detection tests that make
the most sense, automating the process
will dramatically increase the effective-
ness of the tests. One-time, or ad hoc,
queries serve limited functionality on a
going-forward basis. Instead, transform
the query into a one-click process. Each 
of these tools permits customization
through the use of saved processes using
variables and user-entered parameters.
The most powerful software and hard-
ware cannot compensate for poor or non-
existent personnel training. Successful
auditors, whether from financial or tech-
nical backgrounds, typically motivate
themselves to learn the relevant skills. 






Know the Signal-to-Noise Ratio
In testing procurement or other 
financial data for fraud (the signal), the
risk for identifying false positives (noise)
is present and increases dramatically
with the size and complexity of the 
organization. To illustrate the signal-to-
noise ratio principle and its ramifications
for adopting a sensible fraud detection
approach, we use the statistical concepts
of Type I and Type II errors as shown 
in Figure 2.
A trade-off exists between control-
ling Type I and Type II errors such that 
decreasing one increases the other. 
Clearly, the goal must be to minimize
Type II errors (“misses”) by increasing
the analytical test’s power (or discrimi-
nation capability to distinguish a fraud
pattern from other types of unusual vari-
ations in the data). Without any time, 
personnel or financial constraints, the 
auditor would design tests to reduce 
the risk of a Type II Error by accepting 
a larger number of false positives.9 As
budget and personnel constraints always
exist, perhaps more so in a government
agency, we should design tests to limit
the number of false positives. Without
advance planning, the auditor will 
likely experience a sort of “death by a
thousand cuts” from an overwhelming
number of red herrings, or red flags that
are really only false positives. Limiting
the false positives comes through two
main areas. First, an inductive approach
of identifying specific symptoms at an
organization results in more targeted
tests. Compare the following two tests as
shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2: Decision Errors and Associated Costs
Reality
Decision Fraud is Not Present Fraud is Present
Fraud is Not Present Correct Assessment Type II Error (Miss)
Fraud is Present Type I Error Correct Assessment
(False Positive)
Here the test has been customized 
to give the auditor more meaningful 
results by stratifying the population
using cost centers and specifying addi-
tional criteria. Not only will this test 
reduce the number of false positives, 
but also it will be so much more useful
in nonfraud applications. Such tests
could also be randomized in terms of
achieving total audit coverage over a
pre-determined number of years.
The second method for reducing false
positives involves changing the thresh-
olds. If $10,000 gives too many hits, 
and $50,000 very few, try a number in 
the middle; or, if the concern is confined
to a certain range, use that range. 
Essentially, the process uses trial-
and-error to determine an optimum
threshold level to use. However, the
government auditor should also remain
alert for so-called “tip-of-the-iceberg” 
occurrences that warrant a deeper 
investigation. For instance, the “trickle
leading to the waterfall” hypothesis
suggests that many frauds start out with
small or immaterial amounts—some-
times because the perpetrator is testing
whetherthe coast is clear—and over time
cumulate to large, material amounts.10
After building the foundation of key
fraud detection principles governing
data analysis, we can focus on creating
meaningful tests. The following section
describes three main types of testing
methods to apply in a fraud detection
program.
DESIGNING THE TESTS
In this section, we consider the dif-
ferent types of testing that the govern-
ment auditor might typically undertake:
compliance testing, pattern analysis and
other tests. What types of tests, when 
included as part of a fraud detection
program, are likely to produce the best
results? We now offer a discussion of
each of the testing methods. 
Compliance Testing
Compliance tests attempt to deter-
mine the extent to which the data 
complies with existing current laws 
and regulations, policies and proce-
dures. Examples include testing for 
gaps in checks or purchase order (PO)
numbers, proper approval for certain
dollar thresholds, correct calculation of
discount percentages, etc. Such tests 
typically belong as part of an effective
internal control environment, but can
quickly give the auditor helpful knowl-
edge in designing other tests and 
understanding the state of the data.
These more simple tests search for 
fraud risk factors and turn up Type 
I false-positives; however, in the context
of process improvement, such false-pos-
itives may be true indicators of another
nonfraudulent issue. After investigat-
ing the significant exceptions, each set
of results can later be used as a cross-
reference tool. Rather than spending
time investigating each record extracted
by the test, observe any consistencies
across the tests. Does a particular loca-
tion of the procurement department
have a higher than expected instance 
of POs without approval, vendors with
missed discounts, duplicate payments,
etc.? On a limited budget, investigat-
ing each potential anomaly is imprac-
tical. Instead compare the results in a sort 
of cross validation, by determining 
what vendors, employees, etc. appear
most frequently.
Pattern Analysis
Whereas the compliance tests de-
scribed above compare data to certain
expectations or procedures, this section
describes testing for the unknown. Off
the cuff, most auditors cannot estimate
the average invoice amount for the top
25 vendors of their respective organi-
zation, or the average change in prod-
uct price from period to period. Each 
organization has certain characteristics
and trends that most transactions seem
to follow. Does your agency purchase
materials or services more at the begin-
ning of a budget period than the end?
How often do your suppliers change
prices? The sheer volume of activity in
a large organization masks the sim-
plicity of improprieties such as false
billing and improper payments schemes.
In a sense, such schemes “slip through
the cracks” of supposedly watchful eyes,
only to be discovered by chance. This 
is why creating precise custom searches
is so effective and important. 
Other Tests
Tests in this category include those
where additional training and resources
result in more sophisticated analysis.
Statistical analyses such as histograms
of procurement transactions, multiple
regression techniques, etc. can reveal
unique trends and characteristics. Tradi-
tional tests and analyses such as vertical
and horizontal analysis as well as fluctu-
ation analysis may be less successful in
revealing such trends. Data warehouse
and data mining packages included in
data base systems or purchased as sepa-
rate applications can identify myriad
characteristics, patterns and tendencies
of the data. The advantage of using a data
warehouse approach is that the auditor
performs the analysis using an OLAP
(Online Analytic Processing) data base,
as opposed to an OLTP(Online Transac-
tion Processing) data base. The design of
the OLTPdata base allows the quick and
accurate recording of “operational data,”
but does not easily permit the type 
of analysis of “informational data” that
an OLAP data base provides.11 Addi-
tionally, these tests can incorporate
many features of the previous tests for
even more efficient processing and 
discovery of hidden relationships in 
the data. Neural networks, an artificial 
Figure 3: Designing Focused Tests
Original Test
All purchase orders of more than
$10,000 without proper approval
Revised test
All cost centers (or other 
appropriate unit) with a quantity 
of unauthorized purchase orders 
of more than $10,000 greater than
[some meaningful number]
intelligence technology that has pow-
erful pattern recognition capabilities, 
act on data by detecting an existing, 
hidden, underlying organization.12 These
patterns can then be compared to infor-
mation received on a real-time basis.
However, these are fairly sophisticated
data mining and fraud detection tools.
Digital analysis uses the principles of
Benford’s law and detects irregularities
in the expected digital frequencies in a
list of numbers. Essentially, Benford’s
Law explains the counter-intuitive phe-
nomenon that numbers beginning in 
a one or two appear much more fre-
quently—a combined 48 percent of 
the time—than numbers beginning with 
an eight or nine. Testing for adherence
to this law requires a conforming data 
set and functional software. Without 
artificial influences, such as approval
limits, a spike or decline in the expected
frequencies denotes an anomaly. Fur-
ther investigation will demonstrate the
root cause of the variation, whether
sourced in fraud or caused by unnatural
distortions such as approval limits.13
CONCLUSION
Procurement fraud leads to the diver-
sion of scarce resources for inappro-
priate, illegal, ineffective or inefficient
purposes. Beyond preventing obvious
abuse, the government has an obligation
to modernize its priorities, practices and
processes to cope with the demands and
needs of today’s changing world. This
article presented the logic and rationale
behind numerous data-driven analytic
approaches that could be profitably used
by the government auditor in detecting
procurement fraud.
Effective fraud detection continues 
to move from simple, control-oriented
Computer Assisted Audit Techniques
(CAATs), to complex data manipulations
and financial analyses. In the context of a
procurement process, properly designed
tests separate an effective program that
generates tangible benefits from those
likely to be forgotten at the next budget
season. Such success occurs because 
auditors approach the detection process
using principles, rather than canned, 
predictable checklists. Sound principles
drive data-intensive audit testing strate-
gies, which are likely to be relatively 
unpredictable, efficiently designed and
rigorously implemented. Intuitive audi-
tors can apply such proven detection
principles to myriad situations using 
various tools with the intent of continu-
ally reducing the amount of money 
lost to procurement fraud in govern-
ment. We are hopeful that the principles
of data-driven fraud detection tech-
niques will allow for enhanced auditing
processes and equip government audi-
tors in fighting procurement fraud, waste
and abuse in their respective contexts. 
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